



# InDivEU

Integrating Diversity in the European Union

## D10.4

# Communication and Dissemination Report

## Volume I (Months 1-18)

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This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 822304.





# InDivEU

Integrating Diversity in the European Union

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## Purpose and scope of the Communication and Dissemination Report

The InDivEU Communication and Dissemination Report (Volumes I and II) comprises two project deliverables (D10.4 and D10.7) covering months 1-18 and 19-36 of the project's lifetime respectively. It aims at collecting in a single resource detailed information about the main outreach events where the InDivEU project and its findings were presented, as well as about the InDivEU newsletter, a key tool for the dissemination of project activities and results. This public resource will allow interested readers to delve into the substance of the discussions ongoing in the framework of the InDivEU project on key issues of differentiation and the Future of Europe.

With this in mind, the scope of the InDivEU Communication and Dissemination Report cover the following activities:

- Project newsletters
- Reports from centralised project events (InDivEU kick-off, mid-term and final conference)
- Reports from decentralised project events

## InDivEU Newsletter

<b>Date</b>	August 2019, February 2020
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public
<b>Target audiences</b>	Policy makers and practitioners, academics and researchers, civil society organisations and citizens

### The Challenge of Integrating Diversity in the European Union, August 2019

*Editorial by Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, InDivEU Coordinator*

In January 2018, the Schuman Centre together with colleagues from a very strong consortium of scholars launched a three-year H2020 project on Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU).



The key concept is Differentiated Integration (DI), which refers to individual countries (both EU members and non-members) having different levels of involvement in particular policy fields, as well as different degrees of institutional engagement and participation.

In-depth scholarly analysis of Differentiated Integration could not be more timely. Brexit has brought the

difference between internal and external differentiation sharply into focus. As a member state, the United Kingdom opted out of policy fields that related to core state power such as the euro and Schengen. However, its decision to leave the EU transformed the UK into a third country in the making, and as the Brexit negotiations progressed it became clearer that it was far easier to achieve opt-outs as a member state than opt-ins as a third country.

The EU has a range of differentiated relationships with countries on its borders. Brexit has had implications for other non-member states, notably Switzerland. Although the



Swiss-EU negotiations began before, the Brexit referendum has altered the context within which the future relationship will play out. Members of the European Economic Area (EEA) are also paying considerable attention to the potential impact of Brexit on their relationship with the Union.

InDivEU's comprehensive research programme will enable us to develop scenarios for policy makers on the future use of DI. Whenever there is a debate on the Future of Europe, discussion of DI forms part of the agenda. How much DI should or could the EU countenance in the next phase of integration?

Read the full newsletter at: <https://bit.ly/3aTRX0Y>

## Does differentiated integration improve citizens' assessment of the European Union?, February 2020

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*Editorial by Frank Schimmelfennig and Dominik Schraff (ETH Zürich)*

Studies of differentiated integration share the assumption that differentiation helps the EU to adjust to the growing heterogeneity of its member states and contestation of its policies. By making it possible that some states move ahead with integration while others stay behind, differentiated integration takes into account diverse national integration preferences and capacities. Differentiated integration facilitates intergovernmental agreement and enables states to integrate at the level they need, prefer and are able to handle. It thus increases not only the problem-solving and decision-making efficiency of the EU, but also its legitimacy as a voluntary community of states and peoples.

Yet analyses of differentiated integration generally operate at the level of states or governments. We know very little about what citizens think of it. Specifically, does differentiated integration improve citizens' assessment of democracy in the EU and thereby strengthen the EU's legitimacy as a political system?

We cannot simply infer from intergovernmental agreement on differentiated integration that citizens approve, too. Citizens have conflicting integration preferences. If their state obtains an opt-out from integration, Eurosceptics are content, whereas Europhiles are displeased. If differentiated integration was just a zero-sum game between winners and losers, it would fail to enhance the legitimacy of the EU overall.



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In a recent paper,<sup>1</sup> we argue that differentiated integration has the potential to overcome this zero-sum game. For one, we assume that the institution of differentiated integration as such, and the opportunity to choose between different levels of European integration, improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU for both winners and losers. Having a national choice from the menu of European integration rather than being confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and having the opportunity to make this choice through democratic procedures of parliamentary or direct-democratic ratification, offsets the losers' displeasure at least partially.



Moreover, the gain that Eurosceptics experience from obtaining opt-outs for their country are likely to be larger than the perceived losses of Europhiles. Typically, Europhiles are supporters of mainstream parties. The parties they vote for not only regularly win elections, form governments and shape policy-making, but have also supported the incremental deepening and widening of European integration. For these reasons, Europhile mainstream party supporters tend to have a high level of satisfaction with democracy and political efficacy. Against this background, losing an opt-out decision now and then is unlikely to affect their perceptions of political legitimacy strongly. By contrast, Eurosceptics are typically supporters of fringe or challenger parties that are unlikely to win elections and form governments, and they have seen the EU deepen and widen against their preferences. For both reasons, they have a personal history of losing, leading to comparatively low levels of satisfaction and efficacy. Against this experience of long-term losing, winning opt-outs from integration may boost their perception of the EU's democratic legitimacy.

We test this argument in an analysis of Danish perceptions of political efficacy around the 2015 referendum, in which Danish voters were asked to give up Denmark's opt-out from integration in Justice and Home Affairs. Our analysis benefits from the lucky circumstance that the referendum took place during a Eurobarometer survey asking respondents, among other things, whether their voice counts in the EU. We are therefore able to test (in a regression discontinuity analysis) the effect that the confirmation of the Danish opt-out in the referendum has had on the attitudes of Danish citizens towards the EU.

<sup>1</sup>SCHRAFF, Dominik, SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank, Does differentiated integration strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU? Evidence from the 2015 Danish opt-out referendum, EUI RSCAS, 2020/11, European Governance and Politics Programme, available at <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/66164>





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The analysis shows that the opt-out referendum boosted people's perceptions of their ability to affect EU politics. We also find that, while Europhile mainstream party supporters did not change their attitude significantly, Eurosceptic fringe party supporters improved their perceptions of political efficacy in the EU substantively (by 12.5 percentage points). Naturally, findings from a single case need to be treated with caution and call for more studies on citizens' evaluation of differentiated integration. But Denmark can be considered a hard case for finding differentiation effects because Danish citizens enjoy a high level of efficacy in general and have obtained opt-outs for a long time. Our results therefore suggest that differentiated integration can improve citizens' assessment of the EU's democratic legitimacy, indeed.

Read the full newsletter at: <https://bit.ly/3bYBqZP>

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## Project events

### InDivEU Kick-off Conference

<b>Date</b>	24-25 January 2019
<b>City</b>	Florence, Italy
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies – European University Institute (RSCAS-EUI)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public (day 1) and internal (day 2)
<b>Target audiences</b>	Academics and researchers

#### Agenda

10.30 - 11.00 Registration and welcome coffee

11.00 - 11.30 Welcoming address and introduction to the project  
Brigid Laffan | European University Institute  
Frank Schimmelfennig | ETH Zurich

11.30 - 13.00 First round of presentations by Work Package leaders

- Differentiated Integration Beyond the Member States: External and Regional Differentiation, Michael Keating | University of Aberdeen
- The Philosophical Foundations of Legitimate Differentiated Integration, Richard Bellamy | European University Institute, Sandra Kröger | University of Exeter
- The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Citizens, Parties and Governments Want?, Catherine de Vries | Vrije University of Amsterdam

13.00 - 14.00 Lunch

14.00 - 15.00 Keynote speech  
R. Daniel Kelemen | Rutgers University

15.00 - 16.00 Second round of presentations by Work Package leaders

- The Legal Feasibility and Constitutional Acceptability of Differentiated Integration, Bruno de Witte | European University Institute
- The Evolution of Differentiated integration: Patterns, Causes, Effects, Frank Schimmelfennig | ETH Zürich



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16.00 - 16.30 Coffee break

16.30 - 18.00 Third round of presentations by Work Package leaders

- Internal Differentiated Integration in Core State Powers: Money, Budget, Defence, and Schengen, Markus Jachtenfuchs | Hertie School of Governance, Philipp Genschel | European University Institute
- Differentiation Through Flexible Implementation, Sebastiaan Princen | University of Utrecht
- Alternatives to Differentiated Integration, Jonathan Zeitlin | University of Amsterdam

18.00 - 21.00 Cocktail and dinner

## Report

The kick off conference for the InDivEU project was held in Florence on 24-25 January 2019. The first day was open to the EUI academic community, in particular doctoral and postdoctoral researchers. InDivEU Scientific Coordinators Professors Brigid Laffan and Frank Schimmelfennig introduced the overall objectives of the project and its theoretical and empirical underpinning. The distinguished member of InDivEU Advisory Board, Professor Dan Keleman from Rutgers University, presented his thoughts on differentiated integration in his keynote address.

The second day of the kick-off conference was internal to the consortium members only. The coordinators of each work package introduced their work and upcoming tasks and deliverables. There was an in-depth discussion of each work package and the linkages across the project.



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## Differentiated Integration: the future of European cooperation?

<b>Date</b>	14 May 2019
<b>City</b>	Amsterdam, The Netherlands
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Amsterdam Centre for European Studies – University of Amsterdam (ACES-UvA)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public
<b>Target audiences</b>	Academics and researchers, policy makers and practitioners

### Agenda

#### Speakers:

- Ernst Hirsch Ballin | University Professor, Tilburg, and President, TMC Asser Institute
- Huub Dijstelbloem | Professor, University of Amsterdam, and WRR Fellow
- Mathieu Segers | Professor and Dean, Maastricht University
- Frank Schimmelfennig | Professor, ETH Zürich, and Chief Scientist of InDivEU
- Jonathan Zeitlin | Academic Director of ACES, and InDivEU workpackage leader
- Frank Vandenbroucke | UvA Professor

### Report

Is differentiated integration the solution to the many challenges currently facing the EU? This seminar discussed this question in relation to the report on Variation in the European Union ('Europese variaties') by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) published in 2019, and the Horizon2020 project Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU). The event was organised by Jonathan Zeitlin (FMG) in cooperation with the TMC Asser Institute. Frank Schimmelfennig, Chief Scientist of the InDivEU project, participated, as did the three authors of the WRR report, and UvA University Professor Frank Vandenbroucke.



## Panel on ‘The Future of Europe in light of EU elections’, TEPSA Finnish Pre-Presidency Conference

<b>Date</b>	6 June 2019
<b>City</b>	Helsinki, Finland
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public
<b>Target audiences</b>	Policy makers and practitioners, academics and researchers, civil society organisations and citizens

### Agenda

Keynote speech:

Michel Barnier | EU Chief Negotiator, Taskforce on Article 50 negotiations with the United Kingdom: “Brexit and the Future of the EU”,

Presentations:

- Michael Kaeding | TEPSA Chairperson and Professor of European Politics, University of Duisburg-Essen
- Tuomas Saarenheimo | Permanent Under-Secretary, Finnish Ministry of Finance
- Frank Schimmelfennig | Head of European Politics Group, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and Member of the TEPSA Board
- Elisa Pascucci | Post-doctoral Researcher, University of Helsinki

Moderator: Juha Jokela | Director of the European Union Research Programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and member of the TEPSA Board

### Report

TEPSA’s Finnish Pre-Presidency Conference, taking place in Helsinki shortly before the inauguration of the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), featured a panel discussion on “The Future of Europe in light of EU elections” organised in the framework of the Horizon-2020 project “Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU)”. The panel was attended by 71 participants.



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In his address titled “Brexit and the Future of the EU”, Michel Barnier argued that the Future of Europe is much more important than Brexit, as well as the future relationship between the EU and the UK is much more important than the divorce. Showing a sobering projection of European countries’ relative weight in the world as individual actors vs. as EU27, Mr Barnier concluded that the geopolitics of Brexit show that, “if we want to be actors and not spectators of tomorrow, we must stick together”.



Speaking about possible future relationships, Mr Barnier stressed that the best possible scenario would be the UK remaining part of the EU. The second-best scenario would be a “Norwegian regime” (with the UK being part of the internal market but not of the EU), while the third-best scenario would be a free trade agreement on the model of what the EU as with Japan or Canada. However, noted Mr

Barnier, the UK has certain red lines with regard to the future economic relationship, of which the EU is taking note, and which make the free trade agreement the only possible option. The single market, reminded Mr Barnier, is not a free trade zone; it is a real ecosystem, a social, human and economic space between 28 nations, which cannot be unravelled because one country decides to leave.

Michel Barnier also touched upon the Northern Irish issue, arguing that Brexit is a lose-lose game for the parties involved and risks putting in danger the progress made over the years in the settlement of the issue.

Finally, observing that Europe represents an ageing society and a shrinking part of the world, Mr Barnier outlined the main challenges that the EU27 will face in the years to come, namely:

- The need to build a greener EU;
- The need to take our security in our own hands;
- The need to prepare for the next migration crises by developing solidarity mechanisms for those member states which are most impacted, and by developing a true partnership with Africa;
- The need to support European businesses in their quest for competitiveness;

“A united Europe is not a uniform Europe”, concluded Mr Barnier, and our best chance to meet our objectives is to act together, with all our national specificities.



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In his intervention, Michael Kaeding analysed the results of the May 2019 European Parliament elections. As a result of the surge in the turnout, the new European Parliament has now much more legitimacy than the previous one. However, it must not be forgotten that the turnout did not grow in all member states, and there were countries with high level of abstentionism. At the same time, argued Prof. Kaeding, this should not be

translated into a support for the European project, as there were countries where the turnout increased but Eurosceptic parties had a strong success.

Secondly, a major feature of the new Parliament is the loss of majority for the S&D and EPP groups, and the subsequent need to earn the support of the Liberals and the Greens.

When it comes to the internal composition of parliamentary groups, the balance within the EPP changed as a result of the strong Fidesz performance in Hungary, which made the Hungarian delegation the third biggest one in the EPP. Within the S&D group, the Spanish delegation is the biggest one, whilst the German delegation is only fourth.

Finally, an important consequence of the European elections highlighted by Prof. Kaeding is that the new European Commission will have to take into account the new composition of the Parliament, including the increased weight of the Greens.

Tuomas Saarenheimo elaborated on the economic side of European integration and the future of the European Monetary Union. The elections were a “defensive victory” for moderate, pro-European forces, noted Mr Saarenheimo.

He argued that a more fragmented Parliament seems to be a victory for forces who challenge a traditional vision of euro-area economic integration, i.e. the traditional idea, largely a brainchild of EPP forces, that Southern states accept greater control on their economies in exchange for solidarity from the Northern states. Support for this stronger control is weakening, stressed Mr Saarenheimo. The new Parliament, he predicted, is unlikely to want the European Commission to be any stricter in the implementation of economic rules than the previous one. This will result in an erosion of trust between the North and the South. However, Mr Saarenheimo claimed that this should not lead to worry, as he does not see a big role for trust when it comes to building permanent institutions for Europe.



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Frank Schimmelfennig discussed the role of Differentiated Integration (DI) in debate on the Future of Europe. Whereas before DI used to be an “ad hoc fix” to facilitate the integration of new policies where there was opposition between some member states, it is now proposed as a proactive strategy to develop the EU further. While DI has been endorsed by prominent figures, he argued, its usefulness is declining.



Prof. Schimmelfennig argued that the greatest potential for Differentiated Integration today is in the field of defence, which at the moment is weakly integrated. However, the EU is most challenged with the reform and consolidation of areas which are already very much integrated (e.g. eurozone, internal market, Schengen area). Is it possible to identify advantages to use DI in these areas to overcome existing conflicts? In response to this question, Prof.

Schimmelfennig highlighted some risks linked to the use of DI in highly integrated areas:

- There are no procedures to introduce DI in these areas;
- High cost of introducing DI in these areas, especially when it entails one of more countries leaving the said area;
- Risks of cherry picking;
- Some of these issues relate to fundamentals of the European Union (e.g. rule of law), which is not an area where the EU can differentiate without putting an end to European integration as we know it.

Therefore, concluded Prof. Schimmelfennig, the EU faces a dilemma: on the one hand given the high heterogeneity there is a high demand for DI, but looking at the individual policies we find that this would be extremely hard to implement. What the EU needs most at this moment, he added, is strengthening solidarity among member states and strengthening the institutions' capacity to face the challenges, two objectives for which DI is not the right tool.

Elisa Pascucci focused her intervention on how the migration issue was discussed during the EP election campaign and what are the implications of the migration issue for the future development of European integration. In some countries which are heavily affected by migration like Italy, the results of the European elections played in favour of right-wing populist forces, for instance with the League becoming the first party in iconic places for the migration issue (e.g. Lampedusa and Riace).



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According to Pascucci “refugee crisis” is a misleading term, and we should rather be talking about a crisis of the EU asylum system. After the 2015-2016 migration peak, a system was put in place with the concept of hotspot at its centre. These centres are aimed at identifying incoming migrants and streamlining of asylum procedures. Under this system, argued Dr Pascucci, Italian and Greek authorities are forced to identify migrants in a way that makes them responsible for these asylum applications. Complementary to the hotspot system, she reminded, is the EU-Turkey statement, with Turkey currently not accepting returns to its territory from mainland Greece.

Dr Pascucci concluded his intervention with a recommendation to completely revise or even possibly overcome the hotspot system, and to focus the EU’s attention on legal ways of migration and safe passages.

## Panel on ‘The Future of Europe: is differentiated integration a good answer to Euroscepticism?’, TEPSA Croatian Pre-Presidency Conference

<b>Date</b>	29 November 2019
<b>City</b>	Zagreb, Croatia
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public
<b>Target audiences</b>	Policy makers and practitioners, academics and researchers, civil society organisations and citizens

### Agenda

#### Speakers:

- Frank Schimmelfennig | Professor and Head of European Politics Group, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology – ETH Zürich and Member of the TEPSA Board
- Funda Tekin | Director of the Institut für Europäische Politik – IEP, and Member of the TEPSA Board
- Juha Jokela | Programme Director at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs – FIIA and Member of the TEPSA Board
- John Stevens | Chairman of the Advisory Council of the Federal Trust for Education and Research



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Moderator: Paul Schmidt | Secretary General of the Austrian Society for European Politics – ÖGfE

## Report

In the framework of the project InDivEU, on 29 November 2019 TEPSA organised a panel on “The Future of Europe” at its traditional Pre-Presidency Conference, held in Zagreb on the occasion of the incoming Croatian Presidency of the Council of the EU.

The Pre-Presidency Conferences (PPCs) are TEPSA’s flagship activity. TEPSA and its Croatian member, the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO), organised the “Zagreb EU Pre-Presidency Conference – Europe at a Crossroads” on 28-29 November 2019. Croatia will assume the Presidency of the EU Council on 1 January 2020. This will be the first Presidency since the country joined the European Union (EU) in 2013. It will also be the first Presidency working from its start with the new EU institutions, after the 2019 EU Parliament elections. The Croatian Presidency will have to deal with important topics on the EU’s agenda such as negotiations over the Multi-Annual Financial Framework and the consequences of Brexit.



In its introduction to the panel, Paul Schmidt (ÖGfE) proposed looking at differentiation from different angles: what it means for the democratic legitimacy of the EU, how it influences the EU narrative, and how it can be applied to the security and defence area. He highlighted that Differentiated Integration (DI) is not a new reality as it is already widely applied in many policy areas (such as Justice and

Home Affairs, security and defence, the Schengen Area, and social affairs). Examples can be seen of areas where differentiation is working, as well as areas where it is not. Still, the question remains: can those who want to do more do so, and can this contribute to advancing European integration in times of Euroscepticism?

Frank Schimmelfennig (TEPSA & ETH Zürich) analysed empirical evidence in order to answer the question of whether DI helps to counter Euroscepticism. While normative statements and theoretical expectations in this respect are abundant, very little empirical evidence has been collected.

Prof. Schimmelfennig reviewed the main theoretical arguments in favour and against the idea that DI helps to counter Euroscepticism. Arguments in favour claim that DI helps to accommodate the more Eurosceptic member states and prevents the EU from imposing uniform integration schemes, thereby helping to reconcile Eurosceptics with



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progress in European integration: those who want to do less are still able to do so still within the EU scheme. On the other hand, arguments against warn that DI is also used to discriminate against some member states that are as a result deprived of some rights (e.g. CEE countries, who are kept outside of the Schengen area through DI). It is also pointed out that DI risks creating different “classes” of EU citizens enjoying different rights. Finally, opt-outs risk alienating those EU citizens who would like their country to do more, thereby creating more Euroscepticism than it mitigates.

Starting from the assumption that opt-outs create both winners and losers (Eurosceptics will see them as a gain and Europhiles as a loss), Prof. Schimmelfennig argued that if DI was a zero-sum game it would have no effect on EU legitimacy. Yet, he continued, the opportunity to get opt-outs crates a positive net benefit because of two main reasons:

- 1) Having the opportunity to determine a country’s own level of integration in the EU will create support for EU integration both among Europhiles and Eurosceptics within that country (institutional effect);
- 2) Europhiles and Eurosceptics have different baselines: Europhiles support mainstream parties (thus are political winners) whereas Eurosceptics support fringe parties. A decision for an opt-out that benefits Eurosceptics will make them feel that they can actually have an impact on EU politics (perception of legitimacy), whereas an opt-out is seen by Europhiles as merely a minor incident in a long history of political winning.

Prof. Schimmelfennig then analysed the empirical case of the 2015 Danish referendum on ending Denmark’s opt-out from the Justice and Home Affairs area. The switch from an opt-out to an opt-in system was supported by mainstream parties and opposed by fringe parties on both sides. Opponents of the switch won with 53% of the votes. Interestingly, Eurobarometer conducted a survey before and after the referendum, asking Danish citizens whether they believed that their voice as citizens counts in the EU. This allows looking at whether the referendum had any effect on the citizens’ perception of the EU’s legitimacy. Prof. Schimmelfennig noted that after the referendum the positive perception increased significantly. Furthermore, the perception changed to a greater extent for supporters of fringe parties: suddenly, they realised that they could change something according to their preferences.

Prof. Schimmelfennig thus concluded that DI has indeed a potential to narrow the gap between Eurosceptics and Europhiles and to sustain support for European integration. However, there are some caveats. First, the limited amount of empirical evidence available does not clarify whether the effect is derived from DI or simply from the exercise of direct democracy. Second, it is not clear how representative the Danish case



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is, as no similar evidence was observed in other countries. Finally, it remains to be seen to what extent the effect of DI in terms of enhanced perceived legitimacy, if any, is sustainable.

Funda Tekin (TEPSA & IEP) looked at how political differentiation has changed the narrative on the political union in the EU. She defined narratives as constructions and reproductions of stories and political realities, while political union was defined as the ideal goal of the EU as a political community where all member states share the same rights and obligations. In particular, Dr Tekin looked at two key moments in recent EU politics: the years preceding the 2004 “big-bang” enlargement and the peak of the eurozone crisis in 2010-2014. Two overarching narratives can be observed in the two cases, Dr Tekin argued, both centred around unity.

In the enlargement period, the overarching narrative revolved around the slogan “united in diversity” and was characterised by an underlying positive attitude to diversity. This narrative was focused on the need to reunite the continent, in a moment in which the EU Member States were not yet experiencing a high degree of differentiation. At the time, DI was seen as only of temporary nature and linked to specific contingencies. This attitude can be summarised as “Yes we can”.

When the eurozone crisis hit, there was a change of perspective towards DI. A more fragmented EU can be observed, partly because the Member States were very differently hit by the crisis and had different approaches as to how to tackle it. Again, the main narrative was one of “no alternative to monetary integration”, but this time it was rather because of necessity, and the positive attitude towards DI could no longer be observed. More long-term and permanent forms of DI started to be considered, within an overall attitude that can be summarised as “Yes we must”.

Juha Jokela (TEPSA & FIIA) analysed Differentiated Integration in the field of Security and Defence. Dr Jokela observed that there is a stronger focus on EU foreign policy now and on the argument that the EU must become a stronger international actor. A great change happening in recent years was also the return of “great power politics”, which raises the question of whether the EU can be a meaningful actor in such a context. Dr Jokela also noted a change in the European Commission’s approach, which is much more geopolitical now.

Eurobarometers show clearly, Dr Jokela highlighted, that citizens stably support the development of a common foreign and security policy (CSFP). This policy area is also closely connected to the fight against terrorism and migration management. Against this backdrop, Dr Jokela argued, it is plausible to expect that if the EU can advance in these policy fields, this can actually help fight Euroscepticism.



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DI provided new possibilities to make the EU stronger in these policy fields. While DI is not a new reality in CFSP and in the common security and defence policy (CSDP), Dr Jokela observed a clear hesitation to move towards a DI pathway in these areas. For example, while the possibility of a permanent structure cooperation (PESCO) was already included in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, it was only launched in 2017 for the first time. Although PESCO has a modular approach, however, it can be questioned whether it really represents an example of DI given the very high participation rate of EU member states (25 out of 28).

In parallel, Dr Jokela underlined, important results have already been seen in informal forms of cooperation in the security and defence area outside of the EU structure: e.g. the “EU3” structure in the negotiations with Iran (France, Germany and United Kingdom), the “Normandy” format during the Ukrainian crisis, or various other “mini-lateral” defence cooperation initiatives taking place outside of the EU structure.

Therefore, he concluded, in the security and defence area we can see a widely recognised need and popular support for further integration. Against this backdrop, if DI manages to move things forward in these areas then it could indeed provide answers in tackling Euroscepticism. However, it is interesting to note that developments in these areas seem to take place at the margins, if not outside, of the EU. This results in a gradual shift from an “EU” foreign and security policy towards a “European” foreign and security policy.

John Stevens (Federal Trust) discussed Brexit in relation to Differentiated Integration. He argued that Brexit is proof that DI is not a successful policy, as it allowed a sense that it was possible to have pieces of EU integration without any focus on the ultimate purpose. The idea of DI, Mr Stevens stressed, is that all member states would ultimately move towards the same direction, however, in practice, this has led to quite different outcomes. A major factor leading to Brexit, he added, has been a constant readiness from the EU’s side to concede to British requests for differentiation and opt-outs. The UK’s decision not to join the Eurozone, he concluded, was the “fatal decision” that started the Brexit process.

Mr Stevens then reflected on the concept of Euroscepticism, observing that the opinions usually associated with Eurosceptic parties (anti-euro sentiments, narrative based on identity factors, anti-Islam, anti-immigration discourse), while certainly they are not liberal, cannot always be labelled as “anti-European” or as hostile to the European project. Furthermore, he added, being against the current structure of European institutions is not necessarily a threat to the European project, provided that EU institutions are able to adapt.



Finally, Mr Stevens discussed the differences between the United States' (US) path towards federalism and EU integration, arguing that the critical difference has been the status of the European Parliament compared to the US Congress. The missing element in the European project that still needs to be strengthened is the parliamentary element, and as long as the parliamentary context is anchored in the national level, the EU will face major issues, conclude Mr Stevens.

A video recording of the event can be found on our website: <https://youtu.be/FTRPZqzGmVY>.

## Breakfast talk: 'Differentiated Integration in EU-Turkey Relations: Prospects and Obstacles'

<b>Date</b>	4 February 2020
<b>City</b>	Istanbul, Turkey
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Istanbul Policy Center – Sabancı University (IPC-SU)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public
<b>Target audiences</b>	Policy makers and practitioners, academics and researchers, civil society organisations and citizens

### Agenda

Speaker: Frank Schimmelfennig | Professor and Head of European Politics Group, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology – ETH Zürich

Discussant: Atila Eralp | Senior Fellow at IPC – Sabancı University

Chair: Senem Aydın-Düzgit | Research and Academic Affairs Coordinator at IPC – Sabancı University

### Report



On 4 February 2020, Prof. Frank Schimmelfennig (Professor and Head of European Politics Group at ETH Zürich, and InDivEU Scientific Lead) held a breakfast talk at the Istanbul Policy Center – Sabancı University in the framework of the InDivEU project. Prof. Frank



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Schimmelfennig began his talk by reminding why it is important to discuss Differentiated Integration (DI) in relation to EU-Turkey relations. On the one hand, Turkey's EU accession process is de facto frozen, and unlikely to be revamped even under more favourable domestic and international circumstances. On the other hand, despite the worsening relationship and the mix of shared and conflictual interests, Turkey and the EU continue to show a strong interdependence.

Prof. Schimmelfennig pointed out that EU-Turkey relations are an example of external DI, characterised by a selective participation by a third country in some EU policies, without full membership in EU institutions. EU-Turkey relations are not a unique example in this respect: external DI is a long-standing success story of the EU, Prof. Schimmelfennig reminded, and the EU has developed over time ever more fine-grained grades of integration for non-members, ranging from preferential trade agreements to membership in the single market.

Matching the preferences and capacities both on the part of the EU and the non-member state, external DI has emerged as a stable rather than transitional system for the EU to manage relations with certain third countries, underlined Prof. Schimmelfennig. It is a flexible system, allowing both 'upward' and 'downward' mobility, that has allowed for a deeper and wider European integration than a simple binary (fully in or fully out) membership would have enabled.

External DI presents some opportunities as a way forward for EU-Turkey relations, Prof. Schimmelfennig argued. First, it offers chances of cooperation across the board of policies – from commercial and regulatory policies to environmental policies. It also helps remove the focus on accession, too politicised and loaded with cultural and identity issues, which has been blocking avenues of cooperation. In that respect, external differentiation could help depoliticise EU-Turkey relations.

At the same time, Prof. Schimmelfennig also underlined some obstacles to this approach. In some fields that have a high geopolitical character, such as security, there is little room for depoliticisation and technical cooperation. Secondly, external differentiation is not a transactional relationship: it is a (EU) rules-based relationship involving a degree of institution-building that may be hard to accept for a big, sovereignty-focused country, especially when its own governance standards and rule of law are in decline. In addition, Prof. Schimmelfennig highlighted, the deeper external integration becomes, the more it requires ratification not only in the European Parliament (EP), but also nationally – and both the EP and national public opinion have in several occasions expressed their objections to deepening relations with Turkey. Furthermore, he added, it can be observed that the extent of external differentiation is closely related to the non-member's governance standards: the lower they are, the lower is the participation in EU policies.



Finally, Prof. Schimmelfennig concluded by outlining some possible new venues for external DI. While the latter has traditionally had an intergovernmental focus, the EU could explore differentiated integration below the state level, i.e. with subnational authorities that may be more favourable to integration than the state government. However, he warned, the success of this approach requires a degree of local and regional autonomy, and the more centralized the state, the less it appears feasible.

The lecture was followed by a discussion with Atila Eralp, Senior Fellow at IPC – Sabanci University, moderated by Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Research and Academic Affairs Coordinator at IPC – Sabanci University, and with the public.

## The Governance of the Single Supervisory Mechanism for the Banking Union

<b>Date</b>	6 March 2020
<b>City</b>	Amsterdam, The Netherlands
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Amsterdam Centre for European Studies – University of Amsterdam (ACES-UvA)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public
<b>Target audiences</b>	Academics and researchers, policy makers and practitioners

### Agenda

09:30 Welcome address

Jonathan Zeitlin | University of Amsterdam/ACES

10:00 The Dynamics of Collective Decision-Making in the Single Supervisory Mechanism:

The Friction of Sovereign Interests

Alexandre Violle | École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris

11:00 Governance Evolution in the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Actors, Processes, and Tools

Cecilia del Barrio Arleo | University of Trento

12:00 Lunch



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13:00 The Impact of the Governance of the Joint Supervisory Teams in Keeping Euro Area Banks Safe: Insight from the Compliance Theory Perspective  
Jakub Gren | European Banking Institute

14:00 The Single Supervisory Mechanism in Action: Experimentalist Practices Beneath a Hierarchical Veneer?

Jonathan Zeitlin | University of Amsterdam/ACES

15:00 Coffee and Concluding Discussion

## Report

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for the European Banking Union is widely recognised as one of the most significant institutional reforms introduced in response to the financial and sovereign debt crises. Aimed at enhancing financial stability by breaking up “cosy relationships” between domestic banks and supervisors, the SSM has final authority to grant and withdraw banking licenses within the Eurozone. The European Central Bank (ECB) directly supervises the largest/most significant Eurozone banks and can take over the supervision of less significant banks from national authorities where it deems this necessary. Yet the SSM is also a complex transnational organisation, whose highest decision-making bodies comprise a strong majority of national representatives, while ECB and national officials work closely together in Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs) for overseeing significant financial institutions. Five years after the SSM’s establishment, this research workshop explored how the ensuing tensions play out in practice within Eurozone banking supervision. Drawing on expert interviews and participant observation at the ECB and national authorities as well as documentary research, the speakers illuminated how the SSM works in action using a variety of theoretical lenses, including principal-agent analysis, science and technology studies, and experimentalist governance. The discussion offered valuable opportunities for exchange of views between academic researchers and policy practitioners directly involved in the work of the SSM.

## InDivEU Mid-term Conference

<b>Date</b>	11-12 June 2020
<b>City</b>	Online
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies – European university Institute (RSCAS-EUI)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public



This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 822304.



<b>Target audiences</b>	Academics and researchers, policy makers and practitioners
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## Agenda

### 11 June

10.15 - 10.30 Introduction, Brigid Laffan | EUI, Frank Schimmelfennig | ETH Zürich

10.30 - 12.00 Panel I: Differentiated Integration: Governments, parties, citizens

Chair & Discussant: Frank Schimmelfennig | ETH Zürich

Party Views on Differentiated Integration, Richard Bellamy, Sandra Kröger & Marta Lorimer | UCL, University of Exeter

What do Governments Think about Differentiated Integration?, Stefan Telle | EUI

A Blessing and a Curse? Examining public preferences for differentiated integration, Lianne de Blok & Catherine De Vries | VU Amsterdam

14.30 - 16.00 Panel II: Differentiation in EU Regulation and Implementation

Chair & Discussant: Markus Jachtenfuchs | Hertie

European Union electricity regulation: uniform, differentiated or experimentalist?, Bernardo Rango | UvA

The Single Supervisory Mechanism in Action: Experimentalist Practices beneath a Hierarchical Veneer?, Jonathan Zeitlin | UvA

Differentiated integration and compliance in the European Union, Ronja Szczypan & Stefan Lutzenberger | ETH Zurich, FU Berlin

Patterns of Differentiated Implementation in EU Legislation, Sebastiaan Princen, Hubert Smekal and Robert Zbiral | Utrecht, Masaryk

### 12 June

10.30 - 12.00 Panel III: Effects of Differentiated Integration

Chair & Discussant: Wojciech Gagalek | University of Warsaw

Effects of Differentiated Integration on EU Institutional Trust – Preliminary Results using the Synthetic Control Method, Ioannis Vergioglou | ETH Zurich

Differentiated integration, actually. The Danish case in Justice and Home Affairs, Marta Migliorati | Hertie School of Governance



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14.30 - 16.00 Panel IV: External Differentiation

Chair & Discussant: Bruno de Witte | EUI

The concept of external differentiated integration and its legal limits, Luigi Pedreschi | EUI

Brexit and Borders, Michael Keating | University of Aberdeen

16.00 - 16.15 Concluding remarks and next steps

Brigid Laffan | EUI, Frank Schimmelfennig | ETH Zurich

## Report



**Integrating Diversity in the European Union**

11 June 10.30 - 12.30 Panel I: Differentiated Integration: Governments, parties, citizens	12 June 10.30 - 12:00 Panel III: Effects of Differentiated Integration
14.30 - 16.00 Panel II: Differentiation in EU Regulation and Implementation	14.30 - 16.00 Panel IV: External Differentiation

The project mid-term conference took place on 11-12 June via Zoom. The consortium of outstanding scholars gathered together to present and discuss the results achieved so far.

Presentations were focused around the project aims, namely, contributing concretely to the current debate on the 'Future of Europe' by assessing, developing and testing a range of models and scenarios for different levels of integration among EU member states. Similarly to the structure of the project's research agenda, the conference was organised around four interconnected interdisciplinary blocks.

- The *foundations* analyse the philosophical foundations of legitimate Differentiated Integration (DI), the legal and constitutional acceptability of DI and a thorough exploration of the DI preferences of citizens, governments and parties;
- The *evolution* investigates the patterns, causes and effects of DI;
- The *zooming-in* considers internal and external differentiation, differentiation through flexible implementation and alternative forms of differentiation;
- The *scenarios* provide evidence-based advice on designing future DI.

All presentations have been recorded and are now available on the project website. An overview of the proceedings on Twitter can be found here: <https://twitter.com/tepsaeu/status/1271450544322813954>.



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 822304.



## Panel on ‘The EU’s differentiated future after Brexit’, TEPSA German Pre-Presidency Conference

<b>Date</b>	25 June 2020
<b>City</b>	Online
<b>Partner responsible</b>	Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)
<b>Type of activity</b>	Public
<b>Target audiences</b>	Policy makers and practitioners, academics and researchers, civil society organisations and citizens

### Agenda

#### Speakers:

- Axel Dittmann | German Federal Foreign Office
- Brigid Laffan | EUI
- Frank Schimmelfennig | ETH Zürich & TEPSA
- Funda Tekin | IEP & TEPSA

Moderator: Christian Frommelt | Liechtenstein Institute

### Report

In the framework of the Horizon 2020 project “InDivEU - Integrating Diversity in the European Union”, on 25 June 2020 TEPSA organised a panel on “The Future of Europe” at its German Pre-Presidency Conference (PPC), held on the occasion of the incoming German Presidency of the Council of the EU.

The poster contains the following text: "The EU's Differentiated Future After Brexit", "#PPCBerlin #InDivEU", "Axel Dittmann German Federal Foreign Office", "Prof. Dr. Brigid Laffan European University Institute", "Prof. Dr. Frank Schimmelfennig ETH Zürich", "Dr. Funda Tekin Institut für Europäische Politik", "Moderator: Dr. Christian Frommelt Liechtenstein Institute", "25 June 14:00 CET Online Event", "Integrating Diversity in the European Union", and "The project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 822304."

The PPC is TEPSA’s biannual flagship event, taking place right before the inauguration of each new Council Presidency. Bringing together academics, think tankers, policy makers, media and civil society, the conference aims to discuss the agenda and challenges of the upcoming



Presidency and of the EU more broadly. Due to the current restrictions in place because of the Covid-19 pandemic, the conference was held in a virtual format.

In his introduction, Christian Frommelt recalled that the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) are currently in a decisive period of negotiations. After the 2016 referendum and the UK's decision to withdraw, Brexit became official on 31 January 2020. Subsequently, the UK and the EU entered a phase of negotiations on their future relations after the transition period will have expired at the end of 2020. However, the risk that the two parties will not conclude a substantial agreement is still present. Dr Frommelt thus introduced some key questions to guide the following debate: how realistic is the ambition to have a deal in mid-2020? If the UK's wish for a free trade agreement without an elaborate institutional framework succeeds, will this have an impact on the EU's relations with other non-members such as Norway or Switzerland? What will be Brexit's impact on the remaining EU members and their integration?

Axel Dittmann provided an overview of the German Presidency's stance on the negotiations. Germany acknowledges as a fact that the UK has left the EU, and is now committed to negotiating an ambitious agreement that can be advantageous for both sides. The political declaration that was endorsed by the EU and the UK government is a good basis and remains the guiding principle in the negotiations. The German Presidency aims at reaching a comprehensive agreement that also encompasses a common governance structure.

Mr Dittmann then touched upon what Brexit means for the EU's differentiated future. He pointed out that the EU already has a differentiated present, with many different, partly overlapping, integration regimes. After the UK's withdrawal from the EU, Mr Dittman argued, an area where a closer future cooperation with the UK would be desirable is foreign policy. However, in his view Brexit will not be a game changer for external differentiation, nor a blueprint for third countries' relations with the EU. Brexit, he argued, will not dilute the category of membership, and there will still be a clear difference between being a member of the EU and not being a member. Yet, Brexit may have an impact on the way EU members relate with each other.

Brigid Laffan underlined that, as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, there is now a much stronger desire for a deal in London, which was not the case earlier and which is largely due to the impact of the Covid-19 crisis in the UK on the Boris Johnson government's credibility.

For the EU, she argued, it is important to make sure that the future agreement has a dynamic capacity, as London will not always be governed by hard Brexiters. At the same time, the governance mechanism of the relationship must be coherent and institutionally robust.



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While the EU can compromise to a certain extent in the negotiations, Prof. Laffan underlined, it can only do so within certain limits, as it has to protect the overall integration process and the single market, and ensure that any deal is based on a balance of rights and obligations. It is also important, she argued, that the EU maintains its unity throughout the negotiations.

Another aspect to keep in mind, highlighted Prof. Laffan, is internal differentiation within the UK: Brexit has meant that Scotland and Northern Ireland are being taken out of the EU against their wishes. Therefore, when the EU develops its future relations with the UK, it must also pay attention to its relations to Edinburgh and Belfast and closely monitor the developments in these countries.

Frank Schimmelfennig analysed the likely effects of Brexit on the EU's internal differentiation. The UK, he recalled, was the main advocate of scrapping the principle of ever closer union in European integration. However, he argued, the impact of Brexit on differentiated integration will not be that big.

Looking at some integration dynamics in the last couple of years, Prof. Schimmelfennig highlighted that a reduction of treaty-based differentiation can be observed after Brexit. However, he noted, such reduction has not been dramatic, and similar changes have already occurred in the past.

When it comes to differentiation in EU legislation, while a downward trend can be observed after Brexit, this similar to past post-enlargement effects and does not compensate the extraordinary secondary law differentiation that can be observed in the past years.

In the last few years, noted Prof. Schimmelfennig, a three-tier structure has developed in the EU, with a core EU, a semi-periphery made mainly of non-eurozone member states, and a periphery with countries with major opt-outs such as Denmark and UK. Some experts have predicted a centripetal movement as a result of Brexit, but Prof. Schimmelfennig remained cautious: there has never been a UK-led coalition of recalcitrant member states that would collapse now that UK has left, he argued. Overall, Prof. Schimmelfennig did not see Brexit as a game changer for the dynamics of differentiated integration within the EU.

A similar conclusion was made by Prof. Schimmelfennig on Brexit's impact on the EU's external differentiation (i.e. the institutional structure that the EU has developed with non-member states). Any agreement negotiated with the United Kingdom, he argued, will not be a new institutional model of external DI.

Funda Tekin acknowledged that differentiated integration can eventually make the separation line between members and non-members thinner: as differentiation



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becomes the new normal of European integration, the scope, nature and form of membership will be transformed too. However, in institutional terms, the separation line between members and non-members (which is embodied by the right to sit at the decision table) is likely to remain.

In the run up to Brexit referendum, Dr. Tekin underlined, the EU institutions started to officially acknowledge that DI could be an option for the future of European integration. After the referendum, Juncker's White Paper clearly presented differentiated integration as one of the possible scenarios for the future of the EU. This shows that DI is now part of the picture of future scenarios for EU integration not only in the academic debate, but also in the policy making sphere.

Finally, Dr. Tekin agreed that Brexit will most likely not represent a blueprint for future forms of EU external differentiation, because every country is different, and any future UK-EU relationship demands a tailor-made approach, as the relations with any other third country do. However, she concluded, it did generate a debate among third countries, for example in Turkey, on the possible alternatives to accession.

